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Abstract
One of the results of the clash between immigration policies and economic incentives 
is unauthorized immigration. There is no accurate data on unauthorized immigration, 
but estimates permit some empirical work. The motives for immigrants to enter the 
destination country without formal authorization are the same as those that lead im-
migrants to seek legal entry, and the static labor market model of immigration can be 
used to explain the flows of unauthorized immigrants. There are additional factors 
to consider, however. Unauthorized immigrants do not normally enjoy the same civil 
rights as legal immigrants, so the potential rewards from immigrating are unlikely to 
be the same for legal and unauthorized immigrants. There are other interesting ques-
tions, such as why so many destination countries implicitly accept substantial num-
bers of unauthorized immigrants, even though their formal laws and regulations call 
for their strict punishment and expulsion. Unfortunately, we have few answers. 
If the migrants run into some new … wall, they will simply go around it. 
Or over it. Or under it. Mexicans will show as much ingenuity in getting 
into the United States as Americans would in breaking into British Colum-
bia if the Canadian minimum wage were $70 an hour.1 
Introduction 
The strong incentives for people to immigrate from low- to high-income 
countries clash with the restrictive immigration policies of high-income des-
tination countries. One common result of this clash between policies and eco-
nomic incentives is unauthorized immigration. We obviously do not have very 
accurate data on unauthorized immigration; unauthorized immigrants sel-
dom reveal their status for fear of being detected and deported back to their 
native countries. Estimates do exist, though. For example, the ILO estimated 
1 Cooper (2006, p. 132). 
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that in 1991 there were 2.6 million immigrants living illegally in Western 
Europe. That number was estimated to have doubled by the end of the de-
cade.2 The United States Immigration and Naturalization Service estimated 
that there were about 5 million unauthorized workers in the United States in 
1996, and that the number had risen to 6 million by 2000.3 However, census 
data for 20004 suggest the number was closer to 9 million.4 The Pew Foun-
dation estimated that in 2005 there were between 10.5 and 7 million unau-
thorized immigrants in the U.S. Unauthorized immigrants may account for 
as much as one-third of all immigrants in the U.S., as official estimates by the 
Census Bureau showed slightly more than 36 million foreign-born residents 
in the U.S. in 2005. 
Unauthorized immigration occurs not only in developed economies. 
There are several million unauthorized immigrants in South Africa, which it-
self is not a wealthy country and is the source of unauthorized immigrants to 
high income countries. But South Africa offers much higher wages than most 
of its neighbors. Even though wages are even higher in developed countries 
in Europe, another destination for African immigrants, it is usually much eas-
ier to get to South Africa. “There are no oceans to cross. From anywhere be-
low the Sahara, anyone with a few rand for the truck-driver can hitch a ride 
south. South Africa’s land border is roughly 4,000 km long and extremely po-
rous.”5 Foreign workers in South Africa are important to neighboring coun-
tries; miners’ remittances account for about 10% of Lesotho’s GDP. 
The motives for immigrants to enter the destination country illegally are 
the same as those that lead immigrants to seek legal entry, and the static labor 
market model of immigration can be used to explain the flows of unauthor-
ized immigrants. Nevertheless, unauthorized immigrants do not normally en-
joy the same civil rights as legal immigrants, so the potential rewards from im-
migrating are unlikely to be the same for legal and unauthorized immigrants. 
Also, employers may face possible punishment for hiring unauthorized immi-
grants, which may lead employers to discount the perceived marginal produc-
tivity of unauthorized immigrant workers by the likelihood of their being pun-
ished or having production disrupted by sudden arrests of workers. There are 
other interesting questions, such as why so many destination countries implic-
itly accept substantial numbers of unauthorized immigrants, even though their 
formal laws and regulations call for their strict punishment and expulsion. Un-
fortunately, we have few answers. The quote at the start of the chapter indi-
cates the reason for lack of understanding in the literature of the motivations 
for and the costs and benefits of unauthorized immigration: There has simply 
been very little analysis. Unauthorized immigrants are not easily identified and 
counted, thus there is a huge void in the data. 
2 The Economist (1998). 
3 Data from the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office of Policy and Planning, INS 
website, http://www.ins.gov, January 21, 2001. 
4 Parks and Tricks (2000), Ehrlich (2001) and Magnisson (2001). 
5 The Economist (2000). 
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1   Estimating Unauthorized Immigration 
Unauthorized immigrants are not easily counted, in large part because 
they try to avoid detection and deportation. In a country like the United 
States or France, where the number of unauthorized immigrants is large, 
population censuses seriously undercount the true populations because they 
miss many unauthorized immigrants. Thus, Census data are generally not 
very useful for studying patterns in unauthorized immigration. 
1.1   The Residual Method 
Hanson (2006) describes the most common method for estimating unau-
thorized immigration. He begins with the following formula:




 Lj (1 – dj – imj)                                             (1)
The variable Ut represents the stock of unauthorized immigrants in year 
t, Ft is total foreign-born population in the country in year t, Lj is the official 
count of legal documented immigration in each year from j = 0 up to the year 
t, dj is the mortality rate for the group of immigrants entering each year j, and 
imj is the emigration rate for each immigrant group documented as entering 
in each year j. 
A complicating factor is the continual adjustment of an immigrant’s sta-
tus from unauthorized to legal, and vice versa, in many countries with com-
plex immigration regulations. Immigrants with temporary work permits 
may overstay their allotted time, and unauthorized immigrants may change 
their status by marrying a legal resident, paying a fine, or gaining a legal visa 
through separate legal channels. The 1986 Immigration Reform and Con-
trol Act (IRCA) in the United States provided for an amnesty that eventually 
gave several million unauthorized immigrants legal resident status. Now, in 
the first decade of the 2000s, there is pressure for another general amnesty for 
at least some of the estimated 10–12 million unauthorized immigrants resid-
ing in the U.S. Ideally, we need to incorporate these flows of persons chang-
ing from legal to unauthorized, or unauthorized to legal, status to the above 
equation. Equation (1) can be amended as follows:




 Lj (1 – dj – imj – vj + uj) = Ft – Lt)                                  (2)
where all variables are the same as in (1) with the addition of vj to represent 
unauthorized immigrants who gain legal residence visas in year j and uj to 
represent formerly legal immigrants who lose their legal status in year j. 
Estimates of unauthorized immigration are inherently inaccurate because 
it is simply impossible to come up with accurate estimates for all, if any, of 
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the right hand side variables in (2). The estimate of the total unauthorized 
immigrant population Ut is the residual value after inserting values for all the 
other variables in the equation. First of all, researchers have to make assump-
tions about the inaccurate data available to them. For example, the estimate 
Ut in (2) depends critically on the accuracy of the values for Ft and Lj that are 
inserted into the equation. Most researchers assume that both Ft and Lj are 
undercounted in national censuses and other population surveys, with Ft un-
dercounted more than Lj. In the United States, for example, there is substan-
tial evidence suggesting minority groups are undercounted, and the Census 
Bureau has evidence that over 2% of Hispanics, to which the largest U.S. im-
migrant group belongs, are not counted in the official Census. Assumptions 
about the extent of undercounting must, therefore, be made. Specifically, the 
estimate of the total foreign-born population is
Ft = Ft (1 – λt) + εt                                                                            (3)
where λt is the fraction of the true total foreign population, Ft, that is not 
counted, and εt represents an unbiased random error. Hence, the best esti-
mate of the true total foreign population would be
Ft = Ft/(1 – λt)                                                                                 (4)
provided the fraction of undercounting λt is correct. Similarly, the legal im-
migrant population is counted as
Lt = Lt (1 – ζt) + εt                                                                                                                     (5)
where ζt is the fraction of the true total legal immigrant population, Lt, that is 
missed by the survey or count. 
If the difference between the total and legal immigrant populations is 
relatively small, which will be the case in countries where unauthorized 
immigrants make up a small percentage of all immigrants, then different 
assumptions about the sizes of λt and ζt result in very large differences in 
estimates of the total unauthorized immigrant population. Table 3 below 
presents estimates using the residual method under alternative undercount 
assumptions. 
The most popular estimates of the U.S. unauthorized immigrant popu-
lation, at least in terms of the frequency with which they are quoted in the 
press and by political leaders, are those published by the Pew Hispanic Cen-
ter (Passel 2006). To get their estimate of the number of foreign-born Ameri-
can residents, Pew researchers start with the Census Bureau’s annual Current 
Population Survey, which is based on 80,000 interviews in which households 
are asked where each member of their household was born.6 After adjusting 
6 The Pew method is detailed in most Pew Hispanic Center reports; this and other method-
ologies are also discussed in Bialk (2006). 
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the Hispanic numbers by 10% for suspected Census Bureau underestimates, 
these results are then extrapolated to the estimated whole U.S. population. 
In 2005, this procedure yielded an estimate of 36 million foreign-born people 
in the U.S. Next, the Pew researchers sum the annual numbers of permanent 
residence visas issued, numbers that sum back for decades. Next, they as-
sume that immigrants die at the average rates for each age group of the entire 
population, and they use estimates for return migration from several stud-
ies. Pew researchers admit the return migration numbers are the least reliable 
component in the estimation procedure. Finally, the estimated number of le-
gal immigrants is subtracted from the estimated total foreign-born popula-
tion to arrive at the residual estimate of unauthorized immigrants. 
1.2   Other Methods for Estimating Unauthorized Immigration 
Researchers have devised some other ways to estimate unauthorized im-
migration. These estimates of unauthorized immigration can be augmented 
with other data from assorted case studies, local government records of ser-
vices provided to immigrants, and data from countries that supply most of 
the unauthorized immigrants. For example, the reduction in population in 
Mexican communities not compensated by increases in population in other 
Mexican communities most likely implies that the missing persons immi-
grated to the U.S. and are part of the unauthorized workforce there. 
Another, potentially more accurate, estimation method was used by Snel, 
de Boom, Engbersen, and Weltevrede (2005), who estimated the unauthorized 
immigrant population in the Netherlands using the two-step capture/recap-
ture method from the field of animal ecology. This method has been used to es-
timate animal stocks. Specifically, an estimate of the number of fish in a pond 
can be found by, first, capturing a certain number of fish, tagging them, and re-
leasing them back into the pond. Second, after enough time has passed for the 
fish to randomly disperse throughout the pond, another group of fish are cap-
tured in the pond. Some of the fish in the second capture will be recaptures, as 
evidenced by their tags. By noting the proportion ρ of recaptures among the 
100 fish captured in the second round, the total number of fish in the pond can 
then be approximated as the number of fish captured in the first round divided 
by ρ. For example, if 100 fish are captured and tagged in the first round, an-
other 100 fish are captured in a second round, and five of the fish captured in 
the second round are tagged from the first catch, then the total fish population 
in the pond is estimated to be 100/0.05 = 2,000. Snel et al. (2005) estimate the 
number of unauthorized immigrants in the Netherlands by examining police 
records of random identity checks in two successive periods of time. 
A study by the Swiss research group GFS (2005) used a very different 
method, called the Delphi method, to arrive at a consensus estimate of unau-
thorized immigrants residing in Switzerland. This method consists of a series 
of meetings, discussions, and revisions of estimates by independent research-
ers and panels of experts. The independent researchers must justify their esti-
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mates to the experts, who render judgments. Then, the researchers revise their 
estimates, followed by new judgments by the experts, new revisions by the 
researchers, etc., until there is a convergence of opinion. The accuracy of the 
Delphi approach depends critically on the quality of the initial estimates, the 
knowledge of the experts, and the personalities of the researchers and experts. 
The U.S. government has generated measures of unauthorized immi-
grants from data on the number of detainees apprehended by the U.S. Border 
Patrol. These studies assume that a specific percentage of unauthorized bor-
der crossings are stopped by the Border Patrol, and thus as the actual number 
of detainees varies, total unauthorized crossings are assumed to vary propor-
tionately. Of course, these numbers are then used to construct a total stock 
of unauthorized immigrants in the country after making further adjustments 
for return migration and age-specific death rates. Needless to say, these num-
bers are probably highly inaccurate. 
Researchers in Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Greece have used the records of 
recent legalizations of unauthorized immigrants in those countries. When un-
authorized immigrants step forward and reveal themselves during the legal-
ization process, researchers can estimate what the unauthorized immigrant 
population was prior to disclosure of legal status. Of course, the method has 
to make assumptions about the proportion of unauthorized immigrants that 
volunteer to legalize their status. This proportion varies depending on the 
criteria that must be satisfied for legalization and the trust that immigrants 
have in the legalization process. For example, if there is widespread fear that 
the process is a pretext for their capture and deportation, few unauthorized 
immigrants are likely to participate. 
It should be clear from this discussion that reported data on unauthorized 
immigration are unreliable. However, researchers have to proceed with the 
data they have available to them and make the best of it. It does mean that we 
have to treat the results of empirical studies of unauthorized immigration with 
some skepticism. In a practical sense, it means that unless a statistical result 
“stands out like a sore thumb,” we should probably refrain from making strong 
claims about having discovered some truth about unauthorized immigration. 
2   How Many Unauthorized Immigrants are There? 
Despite the difficulties of estimating unauthorized immigration, estimates 
are available. Given the difficulty of counting unauthorized immigrants and 
the inherent inaccuracy of indirect methods, estimates of unauthorized immi-
grants vary widely. Across the various estimates of unauthorized immigration, 
it is clear that the number of unauthorized immigrants has grown rapidly over 
the past several decades, and for most destination countries, unauthorized im-
migrants constitute a substantial portion of the overall population. 
Table 1 presents estimates of the unauthorized immigrant populations 
in a number of developed economies. These estimates were derived using 
one or more of the methods described above, all of which have shortcom-
Un a U th o r i z e d immi g r ati o n 293
ings. These are all estimates with wide margins of error. Nevertheless, sev-
eral things stand out from the estimates in Table 1. First, unauthorized immi-
gration in isolated island countries like Australia and Japan is much smaller 
as a proportion of total population than in the United States or Western Euro-
pean countries. It is also clear that unauthorized immigration is more than a 
marginal phenomenon. With unauthorized immigrants comprising as much 
as three or more percent of some countries’ populations, this phenomenon 
must have substantial economic consequences.
The unauthorized immigrant population of the United States was esti-
mated by the Pew Hispanic Center to be between 5 and 12 million persons in 
2005.7 Out of the total estimated foreign-born population in the U.S. in 2005, 
about 30% of all U.S. immigrants are in the country illegally. The Pew Center 
further estimates that 56% of the unauthorized immigrants, or 6.2 million, are 
from Mexico, 22% are from elsewhere in Latin America, and 13% are from 
Asia. The rest are from Canada, Europe, the Caribbean, and Africa. Com-
pared to legal immigrants, unauthorized immigrants are much more likely 
to be from a neighboring country like Mexico. This conclusion reflects what 
Table 1 shows, namely, that distant island countries like Australia and Japan 
have relatively fewer unauthorized immigrants. 
With a common 3,000 km border, it is difficult for the United States to stop 
Mexican immigrants who can increase their incomes ten-fold by crossing from 
one side to the other of the border. Most other unauthorized immigrants to the 
U.S. arrived through normal border crossings with tourist, student, or other 
temporary visas, although border apprehensions suggest that some unauthor-
ized immigrants from other countries also cross the border from Mexico. The 
highest concentrations of unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. are in the bor-
der states of California and Texas. Table 2 presents estimates by the Pew His-
panic Center for the individual states of the United States.
Table 1.  Estimates of the unauthorized immigrant population: selected OECD 
countries, 2005a 
Country Number % of Population Year
Australia 50,000 0.2 2005
Japan 210,000 0.2 2005
United States 10,300,000 3.6 2004
Netherlands 125,000–230,000 0.8–1.4 2004
Switzerland 80,000–100,000 1.1–1.5 2005
Spain 690,000 1.6 2005
Italy 700,000 1.2 2002
Portugal 185,000 1.8 2001
Greece 370,000 3.4 2001
a The original studies from the Netherlands and Switzerland provide only ranges rather 
than point estimates. 
Source: Table 1.6 from OECD (2006). 
7 See Passel (2006). 
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Table 3 presents several alternative estimates of the unauthorized immi-
grant population in the U.S. The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice’s (INS) estimates are based on border apprehensions, as stated earlier. 
The remaining estimates are based on finding the residual between legal 
immigrants estimated from immigration statistics and estimates of the total 
foreign-born population from the decennial Census and intermediate Cen-
sus Bureau surveys. The variations in the estimates are due to alternative 
assumptions about the undercounts in Census Bureau surveys and counts. 
For example, in Table 3, Bean, Corona, Tuirán, Woodrow-Lafield, and Van 
Hook (2001) obtained estimates of the unauthorized immigrant population 
assuming the Census Bureau undercounts unauthorized immigrants by 
15–25%; these assumptions are justified by the results from Bean and Van 
Hook (1998).
Table 2.  Pew foundation estimates of the unauthorized migrant population in 
the U.S.: 2005 
California 2,500,000–2,750,000 Indiana 55,000–85,000
Texas 1,400,000–1,600,000 Iowa 55,000–85,000
Florida 800,000–950,000 Oklahoma 50,000–75,000
New York 550,000–650,000 New Mexico 50,000–75,000
Arizona 400,000–450,000 Kansas 40,000–70,000
Illinois 375,000–425,000 S. Carolina 35,000–75,000
Georgia 350,000–450,000 Missouri 35,000–65,000
New Jersey 350,000–425,000 Nebraska 35,000–55,000
North Carolina 300,000–400,000 Kentucky 30,000–60,000
  Alabama 30,000–50,000
Virginia 250,000–300,000 Mississippi 30,000–50,000
Maryland 225,000–275,000 Arkansas 30,000–50,000
Colorado 225,000–275,000  
Washington 200,000–250,000 Louisiana 25,000–45,000
Massachusetts 150,000–250,000 Idaho 25,000–45,000
Nevada 150,000–200,000 Rhode Island 20,000–40,000
  Hawaii 20,000–35,000
Pennsylvania 125,000–175,000 Delaware 15,000–35,000
Oregon 125,000–175,000 District of Columbia 15,000–30,000
Tennessee 100,000–150,000 N. Hampshire 10,000–30,000
Michigan 100,000–150,000  
  Alaska <10,000
Ohio 75,000–150,000 Wyoming <10,000
Wisconsin 75,000–115,000 South Dakota <10,000
Minnesota 75,000–100,000 Maine <10,000
Utah 75,000–100,000 Vermont <10,000
Connecticut 75,000–100,000 North Dakota <10,000
  Montana <10,000
  West Virginia <10,000
Based on March 2005 Current Population Survey and published by Pew Hispanic Center, A 
Pew Research Center Project, Washington DC 20036–5610, http://www.pewhispanic.org   
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3   Some Characteristics of Unauthorized Immigrants 
It is difficult to describe the characteristics of unauthorized populations 
residing in the principal destination countries because they are not a homo-
geneous group. However, the Pew Hispanic Center has taken all available 
data from the Census Bureau and other government agencies to compile sev-
eral studies that, for the first time, shed some light on who exactly are the un-
authorized immigrants in the United States (Passel 2006). 
Out of the 11 million or more unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. in 2005, 
the Pew Center estimates that two-thirds arrived in the U.S. after 1995, 40% 
after 2000. This implies that between 2000 and 2005, close to 1 million immi-
grants entered the country illegally each year. The study estimates that dur-
ing the 1980s about 200,000 immigrants entered the U.S. illegally, between 
1990 and 1995 about 400,000 entered each year, and close to 600,000 entered 
each year in the latter half of the 1990s. The study finds that slightly over half 
of all unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. in 2005 were natives of Mexico, 
and another 20% are from elsewhere in Latin America. Asia was the source 
of 13% of the unauthorized U.S. population, Europe, and Canada contributed 
6%, and Africa 3%. Overall, out of the total U.S. foreign-born population of 
36 million, unauthorized immigrants accounted for 11 million, or 30% of the 
total. Also, the Pew Center’s (2006) research suggests that about 60% of un-
authorized immigrants entered the U.S. by crossing the border clandestinely; 
the other 40% entered through normal entry points and then overstayed vi-
sas, student visas, or other temporary entry permits. 
In 2005, unauthorized immigrants consisted of 5.4 million adult males 
(49%), 3.9 million adult females (35%), and 1.8 million minors (16%). Immi-
grant families were not neatly divided between fully documented and un-
authorized immigrants. Nearly 15 million people lived in 6.6 million fami-
lies that had members who were unauthorized immigrants. Therefore, there 
were about 4 million legal immigrants, U.S. citizens, and native-born Amer-
icans who were part of families that included unauthorized immigrants. 
About 3.3 million were children born in the U.S. who were U.S. citizens. This 
finding complicates the policy debate over what to do about unauthorized 
immigrants already living in the U.S. 
Table 3. Alternative estimates of unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. (thousands) 
                                   INS        Census bureau study           Bean et al. (2001)       Pew 2006
Undercount rate:  – 10% 15% 20% 15% 20% 25% –
1990 3,500 3,766 4,430 4,707 – – – –
1995 5,146 – – – – – – –
2000 7,000 8,705 10,242 10,882 – – – –
2001 – – – – 5,918 7,751 9,864 
2005 – – – – – – – 11,100
Source: Hanson (2006), Table 1, p. 875. The studies shown are: INS (2001); Costanzo, Da-
vis, Irazi, Goodking, and Ramirez (2001), Bean, Corona, Tuirán, Woodrow-Lafield, and Van 
Hook (2001) and Passel (2006). 
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Another important finding by the Pew Hispanic Center’s research on un-
authorized immigrants is that just short of 5% of the U.S. civilian labor force 
consists of unauthorized immigrant workers. While 83% of all adult males 
in the U.S. are in the active labor force, 94% of unauthorized adult male im-
migrants in the U.S. were working in 2005. Finally, unauthorized immigrant 
workers are highly concentrated in certain U.S. industries, most notably in 
relatively low-wage jobs in the agriculture, construction, food processing, 
and service industries. 
4   The Economic Analysis of Unauthorized Immigration 
Very little of the early research on unauthorized immigration was done 
by economists. Sociologists led the way in analyzing why immigrants crossed 
borders illegally, where they came from, and how they survived in their des-
tination countries.8 Perhaps empirically-minded economists were discour-
aged from analyzing unauthorized immigration due to the lack of reliable 
data on unauthorized immigration. Whatever the reasons, economists’ focus 
on legal immigration flows has limited their analysis of immigration in sev-
eral critical ways. First of all, since nearly one-third of all immigrants in the 
U.S. are in the country illegally, any analysis focusing only on legal immigra-
tion inevitably gives an incomplete picture of immigration. Second, statisti-
cal analysis using only an arbitrary two-thirds of a total sample will almost 
certainly result in biased conclusions, especially because the status of being 
unauthorized uniquely alters an immigrant’s opportunities and economic 
outcomes. Illegality imposes costs and reduces the potential gains from im-
migration. Unauthorized immigrants do not enjoy the same legal protections 
and privileges as legal immigrants do, and they tend to have fewer employ-
ment and living options available to them. They often face various forms of 
discrimination and exploitation in the labor market, housing, education, and 
social conditions. Third, the inflows and outflows of unauthorized immi-
grants do not react to shifts in legal barriers to immigration in the same way 
as legal immigrants. In most destination countries, legal barriers to immigra-
tion cause a backlog of people seeking to immigrate. 
Hence, actual annual flows of legal immigrants do not reflect current eco-
nomic and social conditions as strongly as unauthorized immigration, which 
does seem to respond quickly to changes in current economic conditions in 
the source and destination countries. Given the fairly unchanging quotas on 
legal immigration in many immigrant destination countries, flows of unau-
thorized immigrants may seem to over-react to changes in conditions because 
unauthorized immigration is effectively a “spillover” from the constrained 
flow of legal immigration. For all these reasons, the study of unauthorized 
immigration can provide information that studies of legal immigration may 
not readily reveal in standard statistical studies. 
8 See, for example, the review of the sociology literature by Espenshade (1995). 
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4.1   The Supply and Demand for Unauthorized Workers 
The standard labor supply and demand model of immigration can guide 
our discussion of the determinants of unauthorized immigration. First, 
there are costs to unauthorized immigration, which may be higher or lower 
than legal immigration. These costs are related to time, distance, and the 
costs of penetrating the barriers a destination country has erected to pre-
vent the entry of unauthorized immigrants. The bureaucratic procedures 
for acquiring work or residence visas in destination countries can take a 
long time, sometimes years. Hence, immediate illegal entry can be an at-
tractive alternative for many immigrants who do not qualify for visa cate-
gories for which visas are quickly available, such as highly educated work-
ers or business executives. 
Legal immigration usually involves other direct costs, such as transporta-
tion and legal fees. The United States charges some immigrants up to $5,000 
for certain work visas. Unauthorized immigrants evade such legal charges, 
but illegal entry introduces other costs that legal immigrants do not encoun-
ter. For example, immigrants seeking illegal entry may contract the services 
of a trafficker, a people-smuggler, or a “coyote,” as the smugglers operating 
on the Mexico-U.S. border are called. Cornelius (2005) reports that coyotes 
charge between $1,200 and $1,700 (in year 2000 US$’s) for their services, more 
if the immigrant’s final destination is further inland from the border. In the 
United Kingdom, people-smugglers who bring Chinese workers from China 
charge £15,000 to £20,000 (US$ 27,500 to US$ 35,000), which is ten times the 
cost of a standard airline ticket between China and Europe.9 The role of gangs 
in the trafficking of unauthorized workers results from immigration restric-
tions. There is no legal way for the Chinese workers to even get to Europe. 
Airlines will not let passengers board without valid entry visas, and the em-
bassies and European Consulates in China only give tourist or student visas 
to Chinese who can prove they have the high incomes to be tourists or over-
seas students. Hence, poor fortune seekers must rely on traffickers. 
The supply of unauthorized immigrants is influenced by source country 
conditions and the particular characteristics of the immigrants. Orrenius and 
Zavodny (2005) find that unauthorized Mexican immigrants to the United 
States are neither uneducated nor highly educated; they have above-average 
education for Mexico but below-average education from a U.S. perspective. 
Unauthorized Mexican immigrants in the U.S. also tend to be related to other 
unauthorized immigrants already in the country, which suggests that unau-
thorized immigrants follow family networks, not unlike many legal immi-
grants. In fact, the difficulties encountered by unauthorized immigrants may 
make family, ethnic, and language networks even more important for them. 
Both the supply and demand sides of the labor market for unauthorized 
immigrants are affected by overall economic conditions. Supply is driven by 
both source country and destination country economic conditions, and de-
9 Champion and Kaminski (2000). 
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mand is driven mostly by destination country economic conditions. Hanson 
and Spilimburgo (1999) examine the causes of unauthorized immigration to 
the U.S. using data on apprehensions at the border under the assumption that 
unauthorized immigration is directly related to the number of apprehensions 
by the U.S. Border Patrol. They find that decreases in Mexican wages sharply 
increase border apprehensions, and, by assumption, unauthorized immigra-
tion to the U.S. within months. They also find that U.S. wages have less influ-
ence on the flows of unauthorized immigrants from Mexico to the U.S. This 
result does not accord with the more traditional literature on immigration, 
which gives destination country wages a large influence. On the other hand, 
we use annual county data derived from census studies and updates and find 
that Hispanic immigration to the U.S. is more responsive to U.S. economic 
conditions than source country conditions. The differences in findings can 
easily be explained by the differences in data sources. Their weekly data gave 
Hanson and Spilimburgo the significant advantage of being able to measure 
short-term responses to changes in economic conditions, something annual 
census data cannot do. Espenshade (1995) points out the difficulties with us-
ing border apprehensions to proxy unauthorized immigration, although he 
admits that there are no alternatives to using border apprehension data to 
quantify weekly or monthly changes in unauthorized immigration. 
Following his survey and analysis of the motivations for unauthorized im-
migrants from Mexico to the U.S., Hanson (2006) reaches the more general con-
clusion that it is income differences between source and destination countries 
that are directly correlated with immigrant flows. He also concludes that: 
“The perspective that emerges from the data that are available is that Mex-
ico-to-U.S. illegal migration increased in the 1970s and 1980s and averaged 
around 200,000 to 300,000 net unauthorized entries per year in the 1990s 
and early 2000s. The population of illegal immigrants from Mexico in the 
United States includes a substantial fraction of women, is predominantly 
employed in nonagricultural jobs, and has schooling levels that are compa-
rable to or higher than nonmigrating individuals in Mexico. Though many 
migrants maintain ties with family members in their origin communities, a 
majority appear to have settled in the United States on a medium or long-
term basis” (pp. 886–87). 
These conclusions suggest that unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. are un-
likely to leave the country soon. This presents a difficult situation for those who 
have suggested the U.S. needs to find and deport all unauthorized immigrants. 
Hanson (2006) also concludes that there must be large unobserved costs to 
unauthorized immigration from Mexico to the United States because, given the 
income differences, there should be much more immigration. Perhaps the stan-
dard model of immigration does not capture all the relevant push, pull, stay, 
and stay away factors. For example, poor living conditions and working condi-
tions for unauthorized immigrants may partially offset the higher wages they 
earn in the destination countries. The nature of an illegal existence has been 
documented in the press and books, especially in the sociology literature, but it 
has not always been properly incorporated in the economics literature. 
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4.2   Unauthorized Immigration as a Form of Labor Market Discrimination 
The economic costs and benefits of unauthorized immigration can be il-
lustrated using the standard labor supply and demand model first presented 
in the Introduction to Section One of the book. We use this model in its most 
restricted form, which models immigrants exclusively as suppliers of labor. 
As Figure 1 shows, immigration shifts the labor supply curves to the left in 
Source, and to the right in Destination. Wages rise in Source and fall in Desti-
nation, and the remaining workers increase their share of GDP by the area e 
in Source, but native workers lose a share of GDP equal to the area E in des-
tination. The immigrants gain the difference between the areas H and h. This 
model, therefore, suggests that workers in Destination will seek restrictions 
on immigration. 
This representation of immigration may not be accurate for unauthorized 
immigration, however, because the model effectively assumes immigrants 
and domestic workers are perfect substitutes. In general, unauthorized im-
migrants are not treated exactly the same as otherwise identical legal immi-
grants and natives. Unauthorized workers often end up working for lower 
wages and benefits, and in poorer working conditions, than native work-
ers. Also, unauthorized workers cannot find employment in all sectors of the 
economy. Differences in labor union vigilance, selective government regula-
tion, or just tradition often lead to sharp concentrations of unauthorized im-
migrant workers in certain industries and occupations, while virtually no 
unauthorized workers are found in many other industries and occupations. 
Table 4 presents some evidence of the occupational concentration of unau-
thorized immigrants in the United States.
Returning to the labor market model of immigration, suppose that the il-
legal status of immigrants results in the segmentation of the labor market into 
Figure 1. The gains and losses from immigration without discrimination 
Bo d v a r s s o n & van d e n Be r g i n The ec on om i c s of im mi g r aT i on (2009)300
legal and illegal segments, and employers pay different wages in each seg-
ment. Figure 2 illustrates how such a discriminatory scheme distributes eco-
nomic welfare. In the case where immigrants are restricted to certain jobs that 
would not be performed at all in the absence of immigration (say butchering 
hogs or cows in unpleasant meat packing plants or picking oranges in hot 
fields), jobs listed along the labor demand curve from a to b, the wage for im-
migrant workers would fall to $8. Total immigrant wages would be equal to 
area H in Figure 1. If authorized workers refuse to work for less than $10 or 
if there is a minimum wage of $10 that is only enforced for authorized work-
ers, then total wage income for the 0Q native workers will remain equal to 
the gray shaded area E + F. The reservation wage (or minimum wage) of $10 
implies that native workers will not be employed in any of the lower-paying 
jobs between a and b, and the labor market will be perfectly segmented into 
two separate markets with wages of $10 and $8, respectively. 
Notice also that owners of other factors such as capital will still gain from 
the immigration. They will not capture area E, which remains with native 
workers, but the owners of other factors do gain area G by employing immi-
grant workers at the lower wage of $8. Thus, schemes whereby immigrants are 
Table 4.  Unauthorized immigrants in U.S. occupations with 20% or greater share: 2005 
Occupation                                                         Total workers              Undocumented workers
                                                                                                                      Number                 Share
Total U.S. Civilian Workforce 148,615,000 7,255,000 4.9%
Insulation workers 56,000 20,000 36%
Agricultural workers 839,000 247,000 29%
Roofers 325,000 93,000 29%
Drywall installers 285,000 79,000 28%
Construction helpers 145,000 40,000 27%
Meat, poultry, fish processing workers 322,000 87,000 27%
Textile, garment workers 83,000 21,000 26%
Grounds maintenance workers 1,204,000 299,000 25%
Construction laborers 1,614,000 400,000 25%
Masons 198,000 49,000 25%
Dishwashers 367,000 85,000 23%
Production worker helpers 64,000 15,000 23%
Maids, housekeepers 1,531,000 342,000 22%
Graders and sorters in agriculture 74,000 16,000 22%
Painters in construction industry 768,000 167,000 22%
Cement masons and finishers 141,000 29,000 21%
Computer hardware engineers 54,000 11,000 20%
Packaging and filling machine operators 367,000 75,000 20%
Packers and packagers 548,000 111,000 20%
Cleaners of vehicles and equipment 427,000 85,000 20%
Carpet and floor installers and finishers 330,000 66,000 20%
Cooks 2,218,000 436,000 20%
Source: Jeffrey S. Passel (2006), Table 1, p. 12; downloaded from www.pewhispanic.org 
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allowed to work only in sectors of the economy where native workers earning 
pre-immigration wages would not be employed will prove beneficial to immi-
grants and employers without lowering the welfare of native workers. 
The model in Figure 2 can be used to explain the political economy model 
of Hillman and Weiss (1999), in which an equilibrium is reached where un-
authorized immigration is concentrated in sectors of the economy where do-
mestic labor interests are not strong while the majority of voters continues to 
support curbs on legal immigration because they do not want immigrants to 
compete in the labor markets where they work. 
Hillman and Weiss point out that in most European countries that attract 
unauthorized immigrants, undocumented foreign workers usually occupy 
jobs that native workers are not very interested in performing. Vigilance 
against unauthorized immigrants is higher in the higher wage segments of 
the labor market for the simple reason that domestic workers demand that 
unauthorized immigrants be barred from applying for those jobs. Thus, un-
documented workers end up in certain low-paying segments of the labor 
market where they do not compete directly with native workers and employ-
ers actually gain surplus from employing unauthorized workers. Restrictions 
on unauthorized immigrants’ use of public services, such as those passed by 
the federal and many state governments in the U.S. during the 1990s, also 
serve to keep the inflow of unauthorized foreign workers from having a neg-
ative impact on the welfare of native workers. 
4.3   Oppression of Unauthorized Workers 
The illegal status of unauthorized immigrants gives employers in the 
destination country added labor market power. Unauthorized workers are 
in constant danger of being deported and, possibly, punished for their hav-
Figure 2.  The gains and losses from immigration with discrimination 
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ing entered the country illegally. Employers can dismiss the unauthorized 
workers by simply reporting them to the authorities, who will then escort 
the workers out of the country and out of the normal range of responsibilities 
that employers have toward legal workers. The unauthorized workers know 
this, and they accordingly tend to avoid conflict with their employers. They 
also tend to accept lower wages, poorer working conditions and hours, and 
more abuse in the workplace. 
The casual evidence suggests that many employers treat unauthorized 
immigrants on par with legal immigrants. Employers fearful of government 
punishment have an incentive to act as though they are not aware of unau-
thorized immigrants’ illegal status. Many employers of unauthorized work-
ers even contribute their share of social security payments and forward de-
ducted taxes to the government from the immigrants’ paychecks.10 On the 
other hand, the press has reported numerous cases of mistreatment and un-
derpayment. A 2003 Financial Times story describes the plight of unauthor-
ized Burmese workers in the border city of Mae Sot in Thailand: 
Most Burmese workers receive just a fraction of Thailand’s minimum 
wage, and risk prompt deportation by local authorities–often acting in 
league with enterprise owners–if they demand better conditions. Po-
lice routinely arrest, beat and threaten to deport Burmese migrants who 
fail to pay bribes. Deadly violence is also a growing danger. In January 
2002, 17 migrants, their hands bound and throats slit, were discovered in a 
stream near Mea Sot. Thai police, who dubbed the murders as the “normal 
killing” of Burmese workers, advised villagers to float the bodies down-
stream, though a public outcry forced an investigation. … In June, police 
in Mae Sot deported 34 Burmese workers after a labor court ordered their 
employer to pay them back wages.11 
Some of the worst labor conditions for unauthorized immigrants have 
been found in Western Europe and the United States. For example, the As-
sociated Press reported many cases of unauthorized immigrants not receiving 
full, or in some cases, any, payments for weeks of work for contractors hired 
to clean up after Hurricane Katrina damaged towns and cities along the U.S. 
Gulf Coast in 2005.12 And Business Week reported that in 200013, as many as 
100,000 unauthorized immigrants were working in Europe in closed sweat-
shops and denied any contact with the outside world. In contrast, not all 
studies show that unauthorized immigrants are at a serous disadvantage to 
legal immigrants. For example, Massey (1987) found that undocumented im-
migrants in the U.S. earned lower wages because of their characteristics, not 
because they were undocumented per se. Massey explains immigrants’ lower 
wages by their skill levels, the types of jobs that they hold, and length of ten-
ure in their jobs. The types of jobs immigrants hold and their job tenure are 
10 Potter (2006), Jordan (2007). 
11 Kazmin (2003). 
12 Pritchard (2005). 
13 Business Week (2000), “Workers in Bondage,” November 27. 
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influenced by their legal status, so it is still likely that the status of being an il-
legal worker causes wages to be lower compared to legal workers. 
The models in Figures 1 and 2 suggested that employers gain the area 
G from the presence of unauthorized workers willing to work at $8. Sup-
pose, however, that there are many foreign workers ready to work at wages 
below $8, say for any wage higher than they can earn in their native coun-
tries. If employers can collude, exploit unauthorized immigrants’ inability to 
shop around for jobs because of language barriers, threaten the workers with 
arrest, or if they can simply exploit the workers’ lack of knowledge about 
the labor market in the destination country, then employers could lower the 
wage for unauthorized, illegal workers to say $5, as shown in Figure 3. Now 
the area G is much larger. The immigrants still accept the work because the 
wage is well above the source country wage. 
4.4   Discussion of the Labor Segmentation Hypothesis 
To summarize the above discussion, employers gain from being able to 
employ less expensive unauthorized workers, and workers and employ-
ers in other segments of the economy are not too troubled by the presence 
in the country of unauthorized immigrants who work mostly in a few spe-
cific industries where they would not themselves care to work. Representa-
tive of this view are the comments by Rosie Olivares, a labor organizer in 
Fremont, Nebraska, who reacted to the presence of unauthorized workers in 
Nebraska’s growing meat-packing industry as follows: “They’re not taking 
jobs from anybody.”14 “There are only so many people who want to do that 
at the given pay scale,” claimed a manager of the Nebraska Turkey Grow-
Figure 3. The gains and losses from immigration with discrimination 
14 Quoted in Orenstein (1995). 
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ers Cooperative.15 Economists will be somewhat leery of accepting this mar-
ket segmentation argument, and the suggestion that the work performed by 
unauthorized Mexican workers at Nebraska meat packing plants would not 
be performed at all if unauthorized workers were all deported has been con-
tested by many anti-immigrant groups and labor organizations. Workers 
are not so easily segmented into exclusive markets. And, the increased to-
tal supply of labor would, in the absence of strong positive externalities and 
demand-side effects, be likely to cause wages to fall elsewhere in the econ-
omy. But, in the case of unauthorized immigrants, there seem to be some im-
plicit barriers to unauthorized immigrants competing in other labor markets, 
most likely by labor unions and, perhaps, by firms interested in avoiding la-
bor conflicts. Governments may vary enforcement of immigration laws on an 
industry-by-industry basis in response to the different interests of firms, or-
ganized labor groups, and consumers in each industry. 
There are obvious political implications of the market segmentation hy-
pothesis discussed above. Potential employers who stand to gain G will 
lobby hard for legislators to close their eyes to the entry of unauthorized im-
migrants, and labor groups opposing the legalization of unauthorized immi-
grants would be willing to overlook unauthorized workers in segments of 
the market that would probably not exist without cheap exploited labor. 
4.5   Close Variations on Illegality 
Various immigration policies have been devised that directly attempt 
to legally achieve exactly the outcome shown in Figure 2. Such schemes ef-
fectively require employers to discriminate between native and immigrant 
workers. For example, many countries permit foreign workers to enter the 
country temporarily to work at specific jobs where they do not compete di-
rectly with domestic workers, and often these jobs pay substantially less than 
other domestic jobs. Sometimes, temporary contract workers do not have to 
be paid the same benefits, and certain employment taxes are waived. Sea-
sonal jobs in agriculture and tourism often pay wages and offer work condi-
tions that reflect effective discrimination against foreign workers. 
In the 1960s, a number of Western European countries instituted tempo-
rary worker programs that brought large numbers of foreign workers from 
Southern European and Mediterranean countries to specific jobs in certain in-
dustries, e.g. construction. Interestingly, the strong social welfare policies and 
the high levels of civil and human rights in these Western European countries 
soon undermined the discriminatory immigration system that was intended 
to only temporarily bring foreign workers to perform certain jobs for which 
nationals were not available. Family members of the immigrants began to ar-
rive, families formed and grew, and the temporary work permits soon began 
to be converted to permanent residence visas. Formerly homogeneous Euro-
15  Quoted in Orenstein (1995). 
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pean societies have become much more diverse, and foreign-born residents 
have come to account for high proportions of the populations of most West-
ern European countries. 
The United States authorized the Bracero Program during World War II, 
which permitted Mexican workers to do seasonal work in the United States. 
This program was instituted because native U.S. workers were being drafted 
into the armed forces for the war, and fruits and vegetables were rotting in 
the fields of California and Texas. Clearly, the program covered jobs that 
would not otherwise have been done. The program also permitted employers 
to pay lower wages and avoid paying other benefits. The program continued 
after the war, but by the early 1960s strong opposition to it had developed. 
Unions sought to organize native agricultural workers, and the availability 
of temporary workers willing to work for low wages under the special pro-
visions of the Bracero Program undermined organized labor’s ability to press 
for higher wages and better working conditions in the fields of California. In 
the early 1960s, with labor-friendly politicians leading the U.S. Congress, the 
Bracero Program was ended. In 2006 and 2007, the inclusion of a temporary 
worker program in a comprehensive immigration bill before the U.S. Con-
gress undermined support and, ultimately, led to the bill’s rejection. A num-
ber of industries had pressed for the temporary worker program as part of a 
grand bargain that also included stronger measures to curb unauthorized im-
migration, but organized labor groups strongly opposed the discriminatory 
temporary worker provision, and the bargain unraveled. 
This discussion suggests that unauthorized immigration is the logical re-
sult of the destination country’s political process, not an unintended or un-
expected outcome. Indeed, a number of political scientists have described 
immigration policy from this perspective, e.g. Andreas (2000), Massey, Du-
rand, and Malone (2002), and Cornelius, Truda, Martin, and Hollifield (2004). 
This literature recognizes that authorities have some freedom to vary the en-
forcement of immigration laws and regulations. Decisions on how to patrol 
the borders, whether to pursue employers or the immigrants themselves af-
ter they have crossed the border, and whether to punish unauthorized im-
migrants, their employers, or their other accomplices within the country, are 
all open to considerable variation. The choices made by the authorities are, 
therefore, political decisions that reflect the various interest groups within 
the destination country and how those groups are able to translate their in-
terests into political outcomes. Employers of unauthorized immigrants seem 
to have been able to reduce the enforcement of immigration laws in many 
countries. Many articles and studies show that U.S. immigration authorities 
have for many years simply not pursued unauthorized immigrants at their 
places of employment, although it seems to be one of the obvious places to 
look for unauthorized immigrants. Incidentally, there is nothing in U.S. law 
that prevents U.S. immigration authorities from visiting firms and inspecting 
identification and other types of required documents.16 
16 See, for example, the discussion in Hanson (2006, pp. 909–910). 
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4.6   Unauthorized Immigration can be Deadly 
In June of 2000, the world was stunned by the death by suffocation of 58 
Chinese migrants locked in an airtight cargo truck during a ferry crossing of 
the English Channel from France to the United Kingdom. Only two of the 
passengers survived to tell the story of their ill-fated trip from China. The 60 
passengers had spent 4 months traveling from China’s Fujian province via 
Moscow and Eastern Europe. They had paid traffickers to carry them to Lon-
don, where they had been promised jobs that would pay wages well above 
what they could earn in their native China. European leaders replied to the 
tragedy by reiterating their determination to stop the trafficking of humans. 
But, as two reporters for the Wall Street Journal wrote just after the tragic 
event, “Despite the predictable promises of action from EU leaders, no easy 
solutions are on offer.”17 This tragedy reflects the strong incentives for immi-
gration created by the large differences in wages between countries. 
In Japan, companies who need low-wage workers have gotten around 
very firm barriers against immigration by taking advantage of a 1993 pro-
gram that lets Japanese firms bring in foreign trainees for up to 3 years. 
Many of these trainees are in fact underpaid workers performing menial, 
repetitive jobs. More likely, as Figure 2 suggests, the program was set up 
with the specific intention of segmenting the Japanese labor market to let 
foreigners perform certain jobs without impacting native workers’ wages. 
A member of the Japanese parliament was recently caught accepting a 
large bribe from an organization that actively recruits overseas “trainees” 
for Japanese companies; the parliamentarian had pushed legislation to ex-
tend the training period from 2 to 3 years. Life for these trainees is difficult 
and many run away and take unauthorized work in Japan’s underground 
economy.18 
Increased spending on border patrols has made it more difficult for Mexi-
cans and Central Americans to cross the Mexico-U.S. border at the most con-
venient, and safe, places. Therefore, traffickers are more frequently crossing 
the 2,000 mile-long border in remote areas. In 2000, 369 people died of hunger 
or thirst trying to cross into the United States by walking across remote des-
serts or riding in the backs of airtight, sealed trucks. In 2005 an estimated 472 
would-be immigrants died trying to cross into the U.S.19 In an ironic twist, 
the Mexican government has launched a program to equip unauthorized im-
migrants with survival kits containing water, medicines, bandages, and anti-
dehydration powder.20 This is a case of the government of the source country 
spending money to help immigrants overcome barriers paid for by the tax-
payers in the destination country. In the meantime, unauthorized Mexican 
immigrants continue to enter the United States. 
17 Champion and Kaminski (2000). 
18 Nakamoto (2001). 
19 The Economist (2007). 
20 The Economist (2001). 
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5   The Fiscal Costs and Benefits of Unauthorized Immigration 
Unauthorized immigrants are expected to generate various externalities, 
and the most often discussed externalities are the fiscal costs to local, state, 
and national governments. Evidence for the U.S. does not support the pop-
ular belief that immigrants are a fiscal burden, however. Except for refugees 
and elderly immigrants, the remaining immigrants, including unauthorized 
ones, use government services to a lesser degree than natives. Even when 
we include refugees, who are high users of government services and recip-
ients of government transfers, immigrants as a group still use government 
services only slightly more often and receive only slightly more welfare pay-
ments than natives. For example, according to the 1990 census, 9% of immi-
grant families received welfare payments, a percentage that was only slightly 
more than the 7.4% of U.S.-born families that received welfare payments. A 
1992 study for the United States Department of Health and Human Services 
by Kirchner and Baldwin (1992) found that pre-1982 legal immigrants to the 
United States living in the six states with the largest immigrant populations 
were found to pay more in total taxes than they received in government-pro-
vided benefits. 
Not all levels of government are affected the same way by immigrants, 
however. The 1992 study determined that the fiscal burden of immigrants 
fell mostly on state and local governments. The federal government actu-
ally enjoyed net gains from increased income tax and social security tax 
revenues. Apparently the average immigrant is less educated and has a 
larger family compared to natives, so immigrants were more likely to use 
state and local government services. But, because immigrants are also 
younger than natives, they are large contributors to Social Security, a fed-
eral program. 
A study of immigration in European countries suggests that the tax-trans-
fers ratio is not as burdensome as is often feared because governments adjust 
both taxes and transfer programs in order to improve the balance for native 
workers. Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (1998) show that for 11 European coun-
tries, taxes on workers and transfers to the poor were reduced as the percent-
age of immigrants in the population increased. The recent welfare reforms 
in the United States, which reduced benefits to non-citizens, are further evi-
dence that the political process adjusts immigrants’ access to welfare benefits 
as immigration rises. Hence, the fiscal burden of immigrants appears to be an 
endogenous variable, and politics is unlikely to let the fiscal burden become 
more burdensome for voting native workers. 
While the evidence on the fiscal effects of immigrants is sparse, there is 
almost no evidence on the fiscal effects of unauthorized immigrants. Unau-
thorized immigrants do not readily reveal themselves to the government au-
thorities. Also, in many destination countries, especially those with strict civil 
rights laws and traditions, government service providers such as health clin-
ics and schools do not ask immigrants to reveal their legal status. 
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There is a Special Report (2006) by the Texas Comptroller of Public Ac-
counts that estimates the financial impacts of unauthorized immigrants on 
the Texas state budget and economy. During 2004–05, there were an esti-
mated 1.4 million unauthorized immigrants in Texas. Table 5 shows which 
of Texas’ major government-sponsored social and educational programs that 
unauthorized immigrants are denied access to and which ones for which they 
can qualify. Note that in Texas, unauthorized children can attend college at 
in-state tuition rates if they graduate from a Texas High School.
In its estimates, the authors of the Special Report included law enforce-
ment and criminal justice costs generated by these immigrants. Total state 
expenditures for unauthorized immigrants were estimated to be $1,156 bil-
lion. Total revenue paid by unauthorized immigrants was calculated using a 
method that arrived at total state revenue under the assumption that immi-
grants suddenly disappeared. This exercise led to the conclusion that the un-
authorized immigrants’ presence increased the gross state product by $17.7 
billion, which, in turn, increased property taxes, sales taxes, fees for services, 
etc., by $1.581 billion. Therefore, the state government enjoyed a net gain of 
$425 million from the presence of 1.4 million unauthorized immigrants in 
Texas. Table 6 summarizes the study’s results.
The conclusion from the Special Report is that unauthorized immigrants 
are not a drain on state government coffers, as so many critics of illegal im-
Table 5.  Major government-sponsored programs and their availability to undoc-
umented immigrants 
Unavailable Available
Medicare K-12 Education, Higher Ed. In some states
Medicaid Emergency Medicaid Care
Children’s Health Insurance (CHIP) Substance Abuse Services
Food stamps Mental Health Services
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Immunizations
Public housing assistance Women and Children’s Health Services
Job opp. for low income individuals Public health
Child care and development EMS
Source: United States Department of Health and Human Services; published as Exhibit 1 in 
Special Report (2006). 
Table 6.  Costs, revenues and economic impact of undocumented immigrants in 
Texas, 2005 (In millions of $’s) 
Costs                            Revenues 
Education $967.8 State Revenue $999.0
Healthcare $58.0 School Property Tax $582.1
Incarceration $130.6  
Total  $1,156.4 Total $1,581.1
  Surplus/Deficit: + $425 million  
Source: Exhibit 18 in Special Report (2006). 
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migration suggest. To the contrary, because unauthorized immigrants do not 
have access to as many government services and programs as legal immigrants 
do and they actually pay many state and local taxes, for example sales taxes, 
property taxes, automobile registrations, and income tax deductions from pay-
checks, unauthorized immigrants were net contributors to Texas’ fiscal budget. 
6   Unauthorized Immigration: Policy Options 
Immigration policy has generated controversy in most of the destination 
countries in Europe, North America, and the Pacific region. Given the huge 
differences in wages across countries, the restrictions on legal immigration 
that most countries have instituted almost inevitably result in people cross-
ing borders without permission. The static labor supply and demand model 
suggests that there will be groups who find unauthorized immigration to 
work in their economic favor, so there is liable to be implicit support for un-
authorized immigrants in the form of jobs. The demand effects of immigra-
tion also imply that there will be landlords willing to rent housing and retail-
ers willing to provide goods and services to the immigrants. The opposing 
interests within the destination country thus place policymakers in the posi-
tion of having to make difficult choices. 
Among the measures that have been suggested to stop unauthorized im-
migration are: (1) placing barriers on the border, (2) preventing unauthorized 
immigrants from taking the jobs that they seek once they are in the country; 
or (3) creating better jobs in the would-be immigrants’ own country. The lat-
ter is not a short-term option, since that would require investment flows and 
encouragement of international trade, among other things. The first two op-
tions are the ones commonly targeted by policymakers. 
6.1   Border Controls 
Border controls are easier for immigrant destination countries far away 
from source countries. For example, Australia receives relatively few unau-
thorized immigrants because it is an island that is thousands of miles from 
the most common sources of immigrants. The United States, however, shares 
2,000 miles of border with Mexico, the source of over half of its immigrants 
over the past two decades. Western Europe receives unauthorized immi-
grants from Eastern Europe, and it increasingly receives unauthorized immi-
grants from Africa, most of whom cross the Mediterranean Sea to Spain or It-
aly. Some African migrants climb the fence into Ceuta, the Spanish enclave 
in Northern Africa. Like the desert along the Mexican-U.S. border, the Medi-
terranean has caused numerous deaths when overloaded boats sank or high 
waves overwhelmed small boats inappropriate for sea crossings. 
Europe and the United States also receive unauthorized immigrants from 
further away. Increasingly, Western Europe and the United States receive un-
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authorized immigrants from China. The U.S. and Spain are destinations for 
Latin American immigrants from Central and South America. Some of these 
Latin American immigrants travel through numerous countries before cross-
ing the Mexico-U.S. border, making Mexico now also one of the main transit 
countries for unauthorized immigrants. Immigrant trafficking has become a 
large business for Mexican “coyotes.” 
Many unauthorized immigrants do not actually sneak across the borders 
of the destination countries. Evidence suggests that half of all unauthorized 
immigrants enter destination countries legally with tourist visas, student vi-
sas, or other temporary entry visas. Sometimes such visas are obtained under 
false information; often, tourists and students decide to remain in the desti-
nation country. 
6.2   Employer Sanctions 
Sanctioning employers is often viewed as a more effective way to stop 
unauthorized immigration. This will be the case only if unauthorized immi-
grants come for work, of course, but that does seem to be the most common 
reason for unauthorized immigration. One reason employer sanctions are not 
used more frequently is that they directly confront an important domestic po-
litical constituency in the destination country. Furthermore, civil rights issues 
arise. To avoid charges of discrimination, the legality of all workers, includ-
ing natives and legal immigrants, would have to be checked with equal seri-
ousness. Hence, another important domestic political constituency is incon-
venienced. If mistakes are made, natives and legal immigrants will be swept 
up in raids on employers. For example, if immigration authorities only check 
workers on a selective basis, say according to whether they fit some profile or 
are employed in jobs where unauthorized immigrants are most likely found, 
then natives and legal immigrants are likely to face occasional harassment, 
incarceration, and even deportation. 
Ethier (1986) famously showed that successful border enforcement hurts 
the would-be immigrants but helps competing native and legal immigrant 
workers. Employer enforcement, on the other hand, is likely to hurt both un-
authorized immigrants and legal immigrants when employers have trouble 
distinguishing between legal and illegal immigrants. If the employer sanc-
tions are very costly, employers may refrain from hiring any immigrants for 
fear that they might be discovered to be unauthorized. 
Some countries have used employer sanctions successfully, however. Ja-
pan has apparently been able to keep unauthorized immigrant numbers 
quite low (See Table 1) by using employer sanctions and frequent document 
checks in the workplace. Opponents to immigration in the United States in-
creasingly call for the U.S. government to carry out more employee checks 
and, where unauthorized immigrants are found, more employer sanctions. 
After 2007, authorities increasingly targeted industries in the U.S. known for 
hiring undocumented workers. 
Un a U th o r i z e d immi g r ati o n 311
7   Conclusions 
The issue of unauthorized immigration is perhaps best summarized by 
the 2004 bill brought before the California legislature that would have al-
lowed the estimated 2.5 million illegal immigrants residing in California to 
apply for a California driver’s license. After proponents of the bill ran tele-
vision commercials showing a fictional nanny riding the bus telling how she 
is welcomed into her employers’ home and trusted to care for their children, 
but not allowed to drive their car, the bill was promptly dubbed the “let my 
illegal nanny drive my SUV” bill.21 Note that California is the U.S. state with 
the highest proportion of foreign born and the largest number of unauthor-
ized immigrants. 
To the outside observer, the question of whether to issue an official driv-
er’s license to a person not legally in the country may seem absurd. How-
ever, the United States is a country designed around the automobile, and it 
is simply difficult for anyone to hold a job, shop, attend to family matters, 
and effectively live a normal life without being able to drive a car. In fact, in 
2004, 10 U.S. states already permitted people who could not prove legal resi-
dence to acquire driver’s licenses.22 Critics charged that a driver’s license ef-
fectively gives the holder a picture identification document that is used for 
many other things, such as getting on an airplane or train, cashing a check, 
or registering a car. A driver’s license practically gives a person legal status. 
State driver’s license agencies thus become de facto issuers of immigrant vi-
sas! In the case of the California bill to permit driver’s licenses for undocu-
mented immigrants, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, who is himself an 
immigrant, vetoed the measure. 
Our models of immigration show that the benefits and costs of immigra-
tion are complex and spread in an uneven fashion across the economy and 
over time. Unauthorized immigration is, therefore, tolerated by some and 
strongly opposed by others. This chapter shows that there are some impor-
tant differences between legal immigration and unauthorized immigration, 
which further complicates the question of who tolerates and who opposes un-
authorized immigration. How the destination country should treat unauthor-
ized immigrants when they are effectively tolerated, as is the case in many 
destination countries, is a difficult and uncomfortable issue. In later chapters 
on immigration policy, the issue will be discussed again. Recent political bat-
tles about whether to legalize the status of unauthorized immigrants with 
some form of amnesty and legalization of their status is similar to Califor-
nia’s debate about driver’s licenses for unauthorized immigrants. In 1986, the 
United States approved a broad amnesty. In 2007, the U.S. Congress refused 
to consider an amnesty for even some of the 11 million unauthorized immi-
grants. It is not clear how 2007 was different from 1986, but the decisions on 
how to deal with unauthorized immigrants were noticeably different. 
21 Alden (2005). 
22 Edds (2004). 
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